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A TORT-CREDITOR EXCEPTION TO THE
SPENDTHRIFT TRUST DOCTRINE: A CALL TO
THE WISCONSIN LEGISLATURE
I. INTRODUCTION
A spendthrift trust is a trust which, either by statute or the direction of
the settlor, restrains the voluntary and involuntary alienation of the benefi-
cial interest.1 Voluntary alienation is restrained by prohibiting the benefici-
ary from voluntarily transferring his rights to future payments of income or
principal. A restraint on involuntary alienation precludes creditors of the
beneficiary from reaching the beneficial interest in satisfaction of their
claims.'
The primary purpose of a spendthrift trust is to protect the beneficiary.
According to Professor Bogert's treatise on trusts:
1. G. BOGERT, TRusTs § 40, at 148-49 (6th ed. 1987).
2. Id. Such restraints, however, only prohibit alienation of the beneficiary's right to future
payments under the trust; a spendthrift trust does not restrain alienation of payments after they
have been received by the beneficiary.
Thus if A transfers to B, as trustee, $100,000 in bonds to hold in trust for X, with a
provision that B shall pay to X the net income of such bonds, but that X shall not have the
power to transfer his right to receive such income, and that the creditors of X shall not
have the power to reach the right to future income in the hands of the trustee, the trust is a
spendthrift trust.
Id. at 149.
Although two other types of trusts, the support trust and discretionary trust, also restrain
involuntary alienation of the beneficial interest, it is important to draw a distinction between these
trusts and spendthrift trusts. According to Professor Bogert, a support trust is one where "the
trustee is directed to spend only so much of the income as is necessary for the education and
maintenance of the beneficiary, and to spend the income only for those purposes." Id. § 42, at
162. A discretionary trust, on the other hand, is one where the "trustee has discretion whether to
pay or apply income to or for a beneficiary, or to pay or apply nothing." Id. § 41, at 160. The
distinction between the restraints on involuntary alienation of the beneficial interest of each of the
trusts is described as follows:
In the case of the spendthrift trust, immunity [to the claims of creditors] is the result of
an express provision in the instrument which prevents alienation; the beneficiary's interest
in a trust for support is, by its nature, incapable of being subjected to creditors' claims;
while under the discretionary trust the creditor cannot compel the trustees to pay anything
to him because the beneficiary could not compel payment to himself.
Note, Spendthrift Trusts, Attachability of a Beneficiary's Interest in Satisfaction of a Tort Claim, 28
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 509, 509 (1952) (authored by William N. Antonis).
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A settlor may consider such a trust desirable, where provision is to
be made for an inexperienced, incompetent or wasteful person. If
such person had the power to dispose of his right to receive the in-
come from the trust, his incapacity or carelessness would lead him
to anticipate his income and convey to money lenders and creditors
the right to receive future income as it became due. If the incompe-
tent or spendthrift can be restricted so that he can do nothing with
the income until it is paid into his hands by the trustee, then the
beneficiary is more likely to be protected, at least to some extent,
against want.3
Although the validity of the spendthrift trust doctrine4 has always been
the subject of debate - with creditors' rights on one side and settlors' rights
on the other - the majority of United States jurisdictions, including Wis-
consin,5 recognize the doctrine's validity.6 However, the validity is gener-
ally not absolute.7 For example, the trend during the last several decades
has been to recognize certain public policy exceptions to the spendthrift
trust doctrine.' The most common exceptions permit creditors who are
claimants for child or spousal support, or alimony; claimants for public
support; claimants who have provided necessaries to the beneficiary; and
claimants of the beneficiary, who is also the settlor of the trust, to reach the
beneficial interest in the trust.9
Tort creditors of the beneficiary, however, have not received much rec-
ognition. In fact, notwithstanding strong scholarly support for the tort-
creditor exception - support that has prevailed since the early part of the
century'0 - only Louisiana has adopted the exception." While the Wis-
consin Legislature has been liberal in enacting exceptions to the spendthrift
trust doctrine, it has yet to adopt a tort-creditor exception. 2
3. G. BOGERT, supra note 1, § 40, at 149. "The beneficiary of a spendthrift trust does not,
however, need to be a spendthrift or incompetent or subnormal in any way. A spendthrift clause
is often found in carefully prepared trusts in the United States." Id. at 150.
4. The phrase "spendthrift trust doctrine" or "spendthrift doctrine" is used in this Comment
to describe the restraints inherent in a spendthrift trust, i.e. the restraints on voluntary and invol-
untary alienation of the beneficial interest.
5. See Wis. STAT. § 701.06 (1987-88), the text of which is provided infra note 47.
6. See infra notes 18-35 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of these exceptions, see infra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.




This Comment examines whether Wisconsin should join Louisiana and
become the second state to recognize a tort-creditor exception to the spend-
thrift trust doctrine. Specifically, this Comment examines whether the Wis-
consin Legislature should amend Section 701.06 of the Wisconsin
Statutes,1 3 the spendthrift trust statute, to include a tort-creditor exception
so that tort victims of a spendthrift trust beneficiary would be able to reach
the beneficial interest in the spendthrift trust to satisfy their claims for tort
damages.
For those readers unfamiliar with the spendthrift trust doctrine, Part II
of this Comment presents a brief overview of the doctrine's origins and his-
tory, including not only the debate regarding the doctrine's validity, but
also the evolution of the doctrine's public policy exceptions. 4 Part III,
which examines the history and status of spendthrift trusts in Wisconsin,
focuses on whether the Wisconsin Legislature would be likely to adopt the
tort-creditor exception. 5 A detailed examination of the tort-creditor excep-
tion follows in Part IV of this Comment, which also includes a discussion of
the rights and special status other areas of the law have bestowed upon tort
creditors.16 Concluding that the adoption of a tort-creditor exception
would be a wise policy decision for Wisconsin, the author proposes in Part
V that the Wisconsin Legislature amend Section 701.06 to include a tort-
creditor exception to the spendthrift trust doctrine.1 "
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SPENDTHRIFT TRUST DOCTRINE
Although the origin of the spendthrift trust can be traced to early nine-
teenth century Pennsylvania," it was not until the later part of the same
13. Wis. STAT. § 701.06, the text of which is provided infra note 47.
14. See infra notes 18-44 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 45-75 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 76-148 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 149-160 and accompanying text.
18. See E. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFr TRUSTS (2d ed. 1947), where the author attributes the
establishment of the spendthrift trust doctrine to four factors: (1) lack of equity powers in the
early Pennsylvania courts; (2) confusion with cases denying attachment at law; (3) Nichols v.
Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1876); and (4) the influence of text writers. E. GRISWOLD, supra, §§ 26-30, at
21-38.
The predominant factor, however, was the first:
In the early part of the nineteenth century there were no equity courts in Pennsylvania,
and the law courts did not have equity powers. The result was that if a man had what
elsewhere would have been regarded as an equitable right, there was little or no means of
dealing with it in Pennsylvania. Creditors were therefore unable to reach the interest of a
beneficiary, since there was no procedure at law for that purpose. In this state of the law,
the courts became accustomed to interests owned by beneficiaries which could not be
reached by their creditors. When, in later years, the Pennsylvania courts gradually ac-
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century that the spendthrift trust achieved legal recognition as a valid re-
straint on the voluntary and involuntary alienation of equitable interests. 9
Today, the majority of United States jurisdictions recognize, either by stat-
ute, case law, or both, the validity - at least to some extent - of the
spendthrift trust.2"
The evolution of the spendthrift trust doctrine, however, was not with-
out a debate. In some jurisdictions the debate continues,2 1 with creditors'
rights on one side, and the trust settlor's rights on the other.2 2 An argu-
ment against the validity of the spendthrift trust doctrine is that the doc-
trine is in direct opposition to the policy favoring the alienation of
property.2 3 In other words, since the common law invalidates restraints
upon legal property interests, then restraints upon equitable interests, i.e.,
beneficial interests in spendthrift trusts, should also be invalidated.24 This
view, commonly known as the English Rule, has as its primary basis the
protection of creditors' rights. 5 Supporters of the English Rule, for exam-
ple, consider it unconscionable to have a beneficial interest in property that
is not subject to the claims of creditors. 26 According to supporters of the
quired equity powers, spendthrift trusts had become firmly established and an accepted
part of the law.
Id. § 26, at 21-22.
19. Three of the leading early cases supporting the validity of the spendthrift trust are Nich-
ols, 91 U.S. 716; Broadway Nat'l Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1881); In re Morgan's Estate,
223 Pa. 228, 72 A. 498 (1909). Although the Court's support in Nichols was expressed in dicta,
many believe that this dicta was the "greatest single factor in the development of spendthrift
trusts." E. GRISWOLD, supra note 18, § 29, at 25.
20. See G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 222, at 382-438 (2d ed. 1979); see also 2A A.
Scor, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 152, 152.1, at 85-108 (4th ed. 1987); Huff, Spendthrift Clauses:
Legality and Effect on Post-Mortem Estate Planning, 18 INST. ON EST. PLAN. 1 1201-03 (1984).
21. See, eg., Dienstag, The Spendthrift Trust: A Fortress Against Claims for Child Support
and Maintenance?, 73 ILL. B.J. 648 (1985), which not only discusses the pros and cons of the
spendthrift trust doctrine, but also cites cases which adhere to one view or the other. See also G.
BOGERT, supra note 20, § 222, at 406 n.81, which cites New Hampshire, Ohio and Rhode Island
as states which have denied all validity to spendthrift provisions. Alaska, Idaho, New Mexico and
Wyoming are cited as states in which there appears to be no authority regarding the validity of
spendthrift trusts. Id. at 407 n.82.
22. For a discussion of the spendthrift trust doctrine's pros and cons, see Comment, Spend-
thrift Trusts in Wisconsin, 36 MARQ. L. REV. 167 (1952) (authored by Lawrence J. Binder); see
also Dienstag, supra note 21, at 648-49. See generally G. BOGERT, supra note 20, §§ 221-22, at
375-438; E. GRISWOLD, supra note 18, §§ 51-106, at 36-105.
23. See generally G. BOGERT, supra note 20, § 40, at 150-51.
24. See, e.g., Brahmey v. Rollins, 87 N.H. 290, 179 A. 186 (1935). But see Nichols, 91 U.S. at
725; Adams, 133 Mass. at 172.
25. According to the Nichols court, the "doctrine is one which the English Chancery Court
has ingrafted upon the common law for the benefit of creditors" and was of "comparatively mod-
em origin" in 1875. Nichols, 91 U.S. at 725.
26. Brahmey, 87 N.H. at -, 179 A. at 191-93.
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English Rule, creditors are not only injured because they cannot obtain sat-
isfaction for their debts, they are also deceived into extending credit in the
first place because they relied on the beneficiary's "appearance of wealth. '27
Supporters of the validity of spendthrift trusts rely on the principle cujus
est dare, ejus est disponere, which means "[t]he bestower of a gift has a right
to regulate its disposal."28 Applying this principle to the law of spendthrift
trusts, supporters of the spendthrift trust doctrine argue that the settlor of a
trust should be permitted to place whatever conditions he desires on his
gift,29 so long as he violates no law in so doing,30 or, as other courts phrase
it, so long as he violates no public policy.31
In response to the pro-creditor arguments advanced by opponents of the
spendthrift trust doctrine, supporters of the doctrine argue that the doctrine
causes no injury to creditors for three reasons: (1) a creditor cannot be
injured because his status never changes - he has no right to the interest
before the creation of the trust and he has no right to the interest after the
creation of the trust; (2) a creditor has no more right to rely on the exist-
ence of the trust as a basis for extending credit than he has to rely on the
existence of property exempt from creditors under state law; and (3) a cred-
itor should not be deceived by a beneficiary's appearance of wealth since a
diligent creditor can readily determine, by checking the public records, the
restraints on the beneficiary's interest.32 The proponents also argue that if a
27. Comment, supra note 22, at 168-69 (citing Adams, 133 Mass. at 173-74).
28. Note, supra note 2, at 512 n.18; see also Morgan's Estate, 223 Pa. at 230, 72 A. at 499,
where the Latin term was first introduced.
29. See, e.g., Nichols, 91 U.S. at 726, where the Court said:
[We see no] reason, in the recognized nature and tenure of property and its transfer by
will, why a testator who gives without any pecuniary return, who gets nothing of property
value from the donee, may not attach to that gift the incident of continued use, of uninter-
rupted benefit of the gift, during the life of the donee.
Id. at 727 (emphasis in original); see also, e.g., Adams, 133 Mass. at 173; Morgan's Estate, 223 Pa.
at 230, 72 A. at 499.
30. See Morgan's Estate, 223 Pa. at 230, 72 A. at 499.
31. See, e.g., Adams, 133 Mass. at 173. At the time of this case, however, the "only ground
upon which it can be held to be against public policy is, that it defrauds the creditors of the
beneficiary." Id. In contrast, the trend during the last several decades has been to recognize the
violation of public policy when a settlor of a spendthrift trust seeks to prevent certain types of
claimants, i.e. spouses and children for support, from reaching the beneficial interest. See infra
notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
32. Comment, supra note 22, at 168-69 (citing Adams, 133 Mass. at 173-74).
The argument that creditors can avoid deception by checking the public records is questiona-
ble today, however, due to the economic burdens such a search would impose upon some credi-
tors, especially smaller ones. The problems with this argument were already apparent in 1947
when Professor Griswold, in his treatise on spendthrift trusts, wrote:
It will not do to say that creditors should not extend credit to apparently opulent spend-
thrift beneficiaries because the restraints on their interests are a matter of public record
19891
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spendthrift trust were to be held invalid, it would not benefit creditors be-
cause the settlors could still accomplish indirectly their goal of restraining
the voluntary and involuntary alienation of the trust interest by using a
discretionary or support trust.33 "In short, as long as the settlor can accom-
plish his purpose by indirection, the refusal to allow him to accomplish it
directly is rather a restriction upon him than a protection for third
parties. ' 34
The foregoing debate represents a direct confrontation between two di-
vergent public policies - the policy that a donor has the right to dispose of
his property as he desires versus the policy that a creditor has the right to
receive satisfaction from his debtor's property. Despite this dichotomy of
views, the majority of jurisdictions have, nevertheless, "given spendthrift
trusts their blessing, leaving the policy protecting creditors a poor runner-
up."
3 5
What started as an absolute validation of spendthrift trusts more than a
century ago,36 however, has softened with its transformation into a more
"equitable" doctrine. No longer are all creditors equal with respect to
spendthrift trusts. Rather, the trend has been to ignore the settlor's intent
and carve out public policy exceptions to the spendthrift trust doctrine.3 7
which could be looked up. The argument is obviously not applicable to tort creditors.
Moreover, many trusts, including nearly all of those created inter vivos, are not a matter of
record. And finally, the argument is most unrealistic in holding creditors responsible for
not doing what no one really expects a creditor to do.
E. GRISWOLD, supra note 18, § 555, at 637.
33. Comment, supra note 22, at 169. For a brief discussion of discretionary and support
trusts, see supra note 2; see also infra note 64.
34. Comment, supra note 22, at 169.
35. Note, supra note 2, at 513.
36. A good example of just how "absolute" courts considered the spendthrift trust to be, i.e.,
how sacred the settlor's intent was, is contained in the decision of Morgan's Estate:
The law rests its protection of what is known as a spendthrift trust fundamentally on the
principle of cujus est dare, cujus est disponere. It allows the donor to condition his bounty
as suits himself so long as he violates no law in so doing. When a trust of this kind has
been created, the law holds that the donor has an individual right of property in the execu-
tion of the trust; and to deprive him of it would be a fraud on his generosity. For the law
to appropriate a gift to a person not intended would be an invasion of the donor's private
dominion. It is always to be remembered that consideration for the beneficiary does not
even in the remotest way enter into the policy of the law. It has regard solely to the rights
of the donor. Spendthrift trusts can have no other justification than is to be found in
consideration affecting the donor alone. They allow the donor to so control his bounty,
through the creation of the trust .... not because the law is concerned to keep the donee
from wasting it, but because it is concerned to protect the donor's right of property.
Morgan's Estate, 223 Pa. at 230, 72 A. at 499 (quoted in Note, supra note 2, at 512).
37. For a discussion of when creditors may reach the beneficial interest of a spendthrift trust,
see G. BOGERT, supra note 20, §§ 223-24, at 438-68; E. GRISWOLD, supra note 18, §§ 331-93, at
1989] SPENDTHRIFT TRUST DOCTRINE
One exception to the spendthrift trust doctrine, which most jurisdictions
have recognized, is the self-settled trust exception. This exception provides
that creditors of a spendthrift trust may reach the beneficial interest if the
settlor is the beneficiary of the trust.3" According to Professor Bogert's
treatise on trusts, the public policy reasons behind such an exception are
clear:
Creditors have a right that their debtor shall pay their claims before
he makes provision for his own support or comfort. Both existing
and future creditors may be misled into believing that their debtor's
financial situation is sound, because he continues to enjoy the bene-
fits of his property, and perhaps is in actual possession of it,
although that property has been conveyed by a secret trust instru-
ment to be held for the debtor. Generally there will be actual fraud,
but it may be difficult to prove and so the law strikes down the trans-
action as presumed to be fraudulent.39
Even in a situation where the settlor is not the beneficiary, however,
courts have recognized exceptions to the spendthrift trust doctrine for cer-
tain types of claimants. The most common of these exceptions include
claimants for spousal or child support, or alimony;' claimants who base
387-486; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 (1959); 2A A. ScoTT, supra note 20, § 157,
at 186-222; Griswold, Reaching the Interest of the Beneficiary of a Spendthrift Trust, 43 HARV. L.
REv. 63 (1929); Huff, supra note 20, at % 1206; Report, Creditors' Rights Against Trust Assets, 22
REAL PROP. PROB. AND TR. J. 735 (1987); Comment, Spendthrift Trusts in Louisiana, 33 LA. L.
REv. 391, 401-03 (1973) (authored by Craig Henry); Comment, supra note 22, at 173; Note, supra
note 2, at 513; Note, Trusts: Tort Claims as an Exception to the Spendthrift Trust Doctrine, 17
OKLA. L. Rv. 235, 237 (1964) (authored by Frank A. Gregory); Annotation, Trust Income or
Assets as Subject to Claim Against Beneficiary for Alimony, Maintenance, or Child Support, 91
A.L.R.2d 262 (1963); Annotation, Surplus Income of Trust in Excess of Amount Required for
Support and Education of Beneficiary, as Subject to Claims of Creditors, 36 A.L.R.2d 1215 (1954);
Annotation, Validity of Spendthrift Trusts, 34 A.L.R.2d 1335 (1954); Annotation, Transfer of
Interest in Spendthrift Trust by Beneficiary, 24 A.L.R.2d 1105 (1952).
38. See G. BOGERT, supra note 20, § 223, at 438-48. See generally E. GRISWOLD, supra note
18, §§ 471-99, at 538-80; 2A A. SCOTT, supra note 20, § 156, at 164-86; Report, supra note 37, at
740. However, not all jurisdictions void self-settled trusts as to all creditors. In some jurisdic-
tions, e.g., Wisconsin, statutes have restricted the type of claimants who can reach the beneficial
interest of a self-settled spendthrift trust to judgment creditors. See infra notes 47, 53-54 and
accompanying text.
39. G. BOGERT, supra note 20, § 223, at 440-41.
40. For a more in-depth discussion of the support and/or alimony exceptions, see 2A A.
SCOTT, supra note 20, § 157.1, at 186-201; Dienstag, supra note 21, at 648; Griswold, supra note
37, at 64; Huff, supra note 20, at % 1206.4; Comment, supra note 22, at 169; Note, Tort Liability of
the Beneficiary of a Spendthrift Trust, 57 DICK. L. REv. 220, 221 (1952) (authored by Weston C.
Overholt, Jr.).
For a discussion of the specific public policies behind these exceptions, see E. GRISWOLD,
supra note 18, § 339, at 400 ("[I]t is against public policy to provide that a trust shall be wholly
immune from the claims of a beneficiary's wife or children for support or alimony."); RESTATE-
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their claims on the furnishing of necessaries;41 government claimants;42 and
claimants for services rendered and materials furnished which preserve or
benefit the interest of the beneficiary.43
Although these four exceptions to the spendthrift trust doctrine are the
most common, they are not the only exceptions. The Restatement (Second)
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 comment b (1959) ("The beneficiary should not be permitted to
have the enjoyment of his interest under the trust while neglecting to support his dependents.");
see also Huff, supra note 20, 1 1206.3, where it is stated in regard to claimants for child support:
"[T]he social policy inherent in the moral and legal obligation to support one's children is stronger
than the policy allowing the settlor to condition and limit his equitable gifts in the way he
chooses." Id. But see Schwager v. Schwager, 109 F.2d 754 (7th Cir. 1940) (rejecting the RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 (1959)); Dinwiddie v. Baumberger, 18 Ill. App. 3d 933,
-, 3 10 N.E.2d 841, 843 (1974) (settlor's intent given deference despite strong public policy favor-
ing recovery); In re Campbell's Trusts, 258 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. 1977) (unambiguous intent of
testator to restrain all creditors' claims precludes claims for alimony and support); Erickson v.
Erickson, 197 Minn. 71, ._, 266 N.W. 161, 164 (1936) ("The donee's obligation to pay alimony or
support money, paramount though it may be, should not... transcend the right of the donor to
do as he pleases with his own property and to choose the object of his bounty.").
41. The purpose of the settlor in creating a spendthrift trust.., is to protect him against
his own improvidence and to assure him support out of the trust estate. For this reason
ordinary creditors cannot enforce their claims against his interest. Where the claim is one
for furnishing necessaries to the beneficiary, however, to permit the enforcement of a claim
against the trust estate tends not to defeat but to promote the purpose of the settlor.
2A A. ScoTr, supra note 20, § 157.2, at 201-02.
According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 comment c: "If such a claim
[for necessaries] were not enforced, it would tend to prevent the beneficiary from obtaining neces-
sary assistance, and a refusal to enforce such a claim is not necessary for the protection of the
beneficiary's interest under the trust." Id.
For a more in-depth discussion of this exception and how other jurisdictions have treated it,
see G. BOGERT, supra note 20, § 224, at 449-68; E. GRISWOLD, supra note 18, § 364, at 440-42;
Griswold, supra note 37, at 79-80; Huff, supra note 20, 1 1206.5.
42. "Although the beneficiary may need protection against himself and his creditors, he
should not have it against the state." Griswold, supra note 37, at 69.
The issue regarding whether the government can reach the beneficial interest of a spendthrift
trust has surfaced in several situations: (1) when the government is seeking reimbursement for
support of the beneficiary; (2) where the beneficiary of a trust is an alien enemy; and (3) when the
government's claim is for taxes. For a discussion of this exception, its role in the above situations,
and how other jurisdictions have treated it, see G. BOGERT, supra note 20, § 224, at 449-68; E.
GRISWOLD, supra note 18, §§ 342-45, at 403-09; 2A A. ScoTr, supra note 20, § 157.4, at 210-20;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 comment d (1959); Griswold, supra note 37, at 68-69.
43. According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 comment d:
In such a case the beneficiary would be unjustly enriched if such a claim were not allowed.
Even if it were not allowed, the person rendering the services and furnishing the materials
would have a claim against the trustee if he contracted for such services and materials, and
the trustee would be entitled to indemnity out of the trust property.... Even if the trustee
made no contract, the trust estate would be unjustly enriched if it were permitted to retain
the benefits derived from such services and materials without paying for them ....
Where, however, a person acts officiously in conferring a benefit upon the beneficiary's
interest, he cannot enforce his claim against that interest.
[Vol. 73:109
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of Trusts, which lists these four exceptions in Section 157, states in its
"Scope of the Rule" that the list is not exclusive: "The interest of the bene-
ficiary of a spendthrift trust... may be reached in cases other than those
herein enumerated, if considerations of public policy so require."'
The issue remaining, therefore, is whether "considerations of public pol-
icy so require" an exception to the spendthrift trust doctrine when the tort
victim of a beneficiary seeks to reach the beneficial interest in a spendthrift
trust.
III. SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS IN WISCONSIN
A. Wisconsin Statute Section 701.06: Spendthrift Provisions and Rights
of Creditors
Chapter 701 of the Wisconsin Statutes became effective in 1971.45 The
enactment of this chapter, which was designed to "update, improve and
codify [Wisconsin's] property and trust laws," marked the first major revi-
sion of Wisconsin's law of trusts since the original trust statutes were
adopted in 1849.46 The enactment of Chapter 701 is especially significant
since it marked the first time a Wisconsin statute expressly validated spend-
thrift trust provisions.47
Id. (citation omitted). For a more thorough discussion of this exception and how other jurisdic-
tions have treated it, see E. GRISWOLD, supra note 18, § 366, at 444-45; 2A A. ScoTr, supra note
20, § 157.3, at 208-10; Griswold, supra note 37, at 69, 81-82.
Please note that the four types of claimant-exceptions to the spendthrift doctrine that are listed
in the text accompanying notes 25-28, supra, are the four listed in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUsTS § 157 (1959). While jurisdictions have carved out other exceptions to the spendthrift
trust doctrine, these four are the most frequently cited. For a general discussion of other excep-
tions, see G. BOGERT, supra note 20, § 224, at 449-68; E. GRISWOLD, supra note 18, §§ 331-93, at
387-488; and 2A A. SCOTT, supra note 20, §§ 157-57.5, at 186-222.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 157 comment a (emphasis added).
45. Chapter 701 was adopted by Chapter 283 of the Laws of 1969; it replaced former Chap-
ters 231, 241 and 272 of the Wisconsin Statutes, and became effective on July 1, 1971. Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 701.06 Committee Comment (West 1981 & Supp. 1989).
46. Haydon, 1971 Revision of the Law of Trusts, 31 MILWAUKEE B. GAVEL 11, 11 (1971).
47. Section 701.06 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides:
(1) INCOME BENEFICIARIES. A settlor may expressly provide in the creating instru-
ment that the interest in income of a beneficiary other than the settlor is not subject to
voluntary or involuntary alienation. The income interest of such a beneficiary cannot be
assigned and is exempt from claims against the beneficiary until paid over to him pursuant
to the terms of the trust.
(2) PRINCIPAL BENEFICIARIES. A settlor may expressly provide in the creating instru-
ment that the interest in principal of a beneficiary other than the settlor is not subject to
voluntary or involuntary alienation. The interest in principal of such a beneficiary cannot
be assigned and is exempt from claims against the beneficiary, but a judgment creditor,
after any payments of principal have become due or payable to the beneficiary pursuant to
the terms of the trust, may apply to the court for an order directing the trustee to satisfy
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In addition to validating spendthrift trust provisions, Section 701.06
recognizes that these trusts are not always absolute. For example, if the
spendthrift trust is to provide "income" to the beneficiary, the spendthrift
trust is given full effect and creditors of the beneficiary have no right to the
interest until the income is "paid over" to the beneficiary pursuant to the
the judgment out of any such payments and the court in its discretion may issue an order
for payment of part or all of the judgment.
(3) DISCLAIMER OR RENUNCIATION NOT AN ASSIGNMENT. A disclaimer or renuncia-
tion by a beneficiary of part or all of his or her interest under a trust shall not be considered
an assignment under sub. (1) or (2).
(4) CLAIMS FOR CHILD SUPPORT. Notwithstanding any provision in the existing in-
strument or subs. (1) and (2), upon application of a person having a valid order directing a
beneficiary to make payment for support of the beneficiary's child, the court may:
(a) If the beneficiary is entitled to receive income or principal under the trust, order the
trustee to satisfy part or all of the claim out of part or all of payments of income or princi-
pal as they are due, presently or in the future;
(b) In the case of a beneficiary under a discretionary trust, order the trustee to satisfy
part or all of the claim out of part or all of future payments of income or principal which
are to be made pursuant to the exercise of the trustee's discretion in favor of such benefici-
ary.
(5) CLAIMS FOR PUBLIC SUPPORT. Notwithstanding any provision in the creating in-
strument or subs. (1) and (2), if the settlor is legally obligated to pay for the public support
of a beneficiary under [§ ] 46.10 or the beneficiary is legally obligated to pay for his public
support or that furnished his spouse or minor child under [§ ] 46.10, upon application by
the appropriate state department or county official, the court may:
(a) If such beneficiary is entitled to receive income or principal under the trust, order
the trustee to satisfy part or all of the liability out of part or all of payments of income or
principal as they are due, presently or in the future;
(b) Except as otherwise provided in [ ] (c), in the case of a beneficiary under a discre-
tionary trust, order the trustee to satisfy part or all of the liability out of part or all of
future payments of income or principal which are to be made pursuant to the exercise of
the trustee's discretion in favor of such beneficiary;
(c) In the case of a beneficiary under a discretionary trust who is a settlor or a spouse
or minor child of the settlor, order the trustee to satisfy part or all of the liability without
regard to whether the trustee has then exercised or may thereafter exercise his discretion in
favor of the beneficiary.
(5M) TRUST FOR DISABLED INDIVIDUAL. Subsection (5) does not apply to any trust
that is established for the benefit of an individual who has a disability which has continued
or can be expected to continue indefinitely, substantially impairs the individual from ade-
quately providing for his or her own care or custody, and constitutes a substantial handi-
cap to the afflicted individual if the trust does not result in ineligibility for public assistance
under ch. 49. A trustee of a trust which is exempt from claims for public support under
this subsection shall notify the county department under § 46.215 or 46.22 in the county
where the disabled beneficiary resides of the existence of the trust.
(6) SETTLOR AS BENEFICIARY. Notwithstanding any provision in the creating instru-
ment and in addition to the remedies available under subs. (4) and (5) where the settlor is a
beneficiary, upon application of a judgment creditor of the settlor, the court may, if the
terms of the instrument require or authorize the trustee to make payment of income or
principal to or for the benefit of the settlor, order the trustee to satisfy part or all of the
judgment out of part or all of the payments of income or principal as they are due, pres-
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trust's terms.48 However, if the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust is entitled
to the "principal," a judgment creditor of the beneficiary 49 does not have to
wait until the principal is "paid over" in order to reach the beneficiary's
interest. Rather:
[A] judgment creditor, after any payments of principal have become
due or payable to the beneficiary pursuant to the terms of the trust,
may apply to the court for an order directing the trustee to satisfy
the judgment out of any such payments [of principal] and the court
in its discretion may issue an order for payment of part or all of the
judgment. 50
In addition to increasing the rights for judgment creditors when the
beneficiary's interest is one in "principal," Section 701.06 provides that
spendthrift provisions are completely void as to three types of creditors:
claimants for child support,51 claimants for public support,52 and judgment
creditors of a beneficiary who is also the settlor of the spendthrift trust.53
Claimants for public support are the state department or county officials
who have provided public support to a beneficiary whom the settlor is le-
gally obligated to support, or for the beneficiary's spouse or minor child if
the beneficiary is legally obligated to support him or her.54 Due to these
exceptions, spendthrift trusts are not absolute in Wisconsin.5
ently or in the future, or which are payable in the trustee's discretion, to the extent in
either case of the settlor's proportionate contribution to the trust.
(7) SUBSEQUENT MODIFICATION OF COURT'S ORDER. Any order entered by a court
under sub. (4), (5) or (6) is subject to modification upon application of an interested person.
(8) EXEMPT ASSEsTS. Assets of a trust, to the extent they are exempt from claims of
creditors under other statutes, shall not be subject to sub. (4), (5) or (6).
Wis. STAT § 701.06 (1987-88); see also infra notes 56-69 and accompanying text for the history of
spendthrift trusts in Wisconsin.
48. Id. § 701.06(1).
49. A judgment creditor is "[o]ne who has obtained a judgment against his debtor, under
which he can enforce execution. A person in whose favor a money judgment is entered or a
person who becomes entitled to enforce it. Owner of an unsatisfied judgment." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 758 (5th ed. 1979).
50. WIs. STAT. § 701.06(2) (emphasis added).
51. Id. § 701.06(4); see also infra note 72 and accompanying text.
52. Id. § 701.06(5); see also infra note 73 and accompanying text.
53. Id. § 701.06(6).
54. See id. §§ 701.06 (4)-(6); see also Haydon, supra note 46, at 12.
55. See Haydon, supra note 46, at 12.
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B. The History of Spendthrift Trusts in Wisconsin
Prior to the enactment of Section 701.06 of the Wisconsin Statutes in
1971, the validity of spendthrift trusts56 in Wisconsin was unsettled.
7
Although it seemed the courts generally assumed the validity of express
spendthrift trusts in dicta, 58 no case ever squarely decided the issue. The
56. The term, spendthrift trust, is used in this Comment section to describe "express" spend-
thrift trusts, as opposed to "statutory" spendthrift trusts. An express spendthrift trust is one
which the trust settlor/creator expressly designates in the trust terms as a spendthrift trust. A
typical example of an express spendthrift trust contains language such as the following: "Said
trust fund and the income therefrom shall not be liable for the payment of any debts of my said
son, nor shall the same be liable to anticipation, execution or attachment in the hands of the said
trustee." In re Stewart's Estate, 334 Pa. 356, 359, 5 A.2d 910, 911 (1939) (quoted in Dillon v.
Dillon, 244 Wis. 122, 127, 11 N.W.2d 628, 631 (1943)).
Statutory spendthrift trusts are trusts where restraints on the voluntary alienation of the bene-
ficial interests have been imposed by the state legislature. For approximately 100 years, Wisconsin
had what many believed to be two statutes which, when read together, created statutory spend-
thrift trusts because they allowed restraints on voluntary and involuntary alienation in trusts pro-
viding income from realty. The first of the statutes, Wis. STAT. § 231.13 (1849-1969) (originally
cited as Wis. STAT. § 2083), placed restraints on the involuntary alienation of a trust created to
provide income from realty:
PROFITS OF LAND LIABLE TO CREDITORS. When a trust is created to receive the rents and
profits of lands, and no valid direction for accumulation is given, the surplus of such rents
and profits, beyond the sum that may be necessary for the education and support of the
person for whose benefit the trust is created, shall be liable in equity to the claims of the
creditors of such person in the same manner as other personal property which cannot be
reached by an execution at law.
Id.
The second statute, Wis. STAT. § 231.19 (1849-1969) (originally cited as WIS. STAT. § 2081),
placed restraints on the voluntary alienation of the beneficial interest of a trust providing income
from reality:
ALIENATION RESTRAINED. No person beneficially interested in a trust for the receipt of
the rents and profits of lands can assign or in any manner dispose of such interest; but the
rights and interests of every person for whose benefit a trust for the payment of a sum in
gross is created are assignable.
Id.
These two statutes, however, do not truly create a spendthrift trust because § 231.13 does not
allow an absolute restraint on involuntary alienation. Therefore, this Comment section's focus
will be on Wisconsin's treatment of true, express spendthrift trusts, and not on statutory spend-
thrift trusts.
57. See E. GRISWOLD, supra note 18, §§ 234-35, at 283-86; Kroncke, A Decade of Probate
Law, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 82, 120; Comment, supra note 22, at 172; Note, Trusts - Spendthrift
Provisions - Claims for Support, 1942 WIs. L. REV. 148, 150 (authored by Stephen Thierman).
58. See, e.g., Schwager v. Schwager, 109 F.2d 754, 760 (7th Cir. 1940) ("[T]he policy that a
person may dispose of his property according to his own wishes, is ... well established."); In re
Austin's Estate, 258 Wis. 578, 579-80, 46 N.W.2d 861, 861 (1951) (The will's language created
what "is commonly known as a 'spendthrift trust.' "); Welch v. Welch, 235 Wis. 282, 309, 290
N.W. 758, 771, reh 'g denied, 235 Wis. 282, 293 N.W. 150 (1940) (court held there was no spend-
thrift trust in the absence of specific provisions to that effect); In re Wakefield, 182 Wis. 208, 216-
17, 196 N.W. 541, 544 (1923) (Since the settlor "made no attempt ... to shield his son from the
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general validity issue, however, posed few problems. Rather, the real chal-
lenge to the courts was whether the validity of spendthrift trusts was abso-
lute, i.e., whether the public policy behind cujus est dare, ejus est disponere 9
could ever be outweighed by more important public policies.'
One issue during the 1940s, for example, was whether spendthrift trusts
could be held invalid and contrary to public policy in Wisconsin if the cred-
itors trying to reach the trust interest were judgment creditors for alimony
or child or spousal support.61 The Restatement of Trusts at the time specif-
ically recognized an exception to the spendthrift trust doctrine for alimony
and child support judgment creditors.62 However, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, in Schwager v. Schwager,63 seemed to ignore the Restate-
ment's message. According to the court, absent legislative or judicial action
by the State of Wisconsin, spendthrift trusts which "expressly" precluded
the divorced spouse and children of the beneficiary from obtaining alimony
and support were absolute and would not be declared void.,,
claims of creditors," there is no spendthrift trust and creditors may reach the income.); Mangan v.
Shea, 158 Wis. 619, 624, 149 N.W. 378, 381 (1914) (It is "well recognized that a... [beneficiary]
entitled to the absolute payment of the income of personal property held in trust for him, may sell
and transfer his right to such income unless prevented from doing so by the conditions of the
trust.") (emphasis added); Williams v. Smith, 117 Wis. 142, 148, 93 N.W. 464, 466 (1903) (trust
income of personalty was reachable by creditors since trust income was payable to beneficiary
"absolutely and without condition"); Lamberton v. Pereles, 87 Wis. 449, 459-60, 58 N.W. 771,
780 (1894) ("It would seem that the founder of a trust fund may secure the benefits of the same to
the object of his bounty by providing that the income thereof shall not be alienable by anticipa-
tion, nor subject to be taken for his debts.").
59. See supra note 28 and accompanying text for a definition of this Latin phrase.
60. See E. GRISWOLD, supra note 18, § 235, at 285; Comment, supra note 22, at 172-74;
Note, supra note 57.
61. See, e.g., Schwager, 109 F.2d 754 (alimony and child support); Dillon v. Dillon, 244 Wis.
122, 11 N.W.2d 628 (1944) (alimony and child support); see also E. GRISWOLD, supra note 18,
§ 235, at 285; Comment, supra note 22, at 172-74; Note, supra note 57.
62. RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 157(a) (1935).
63. 109 F.2d 754 (7th Cir. 1940) (applying Wisconsin law).
64. Id. at 760-61.
Section 157(a) of the Restatement of Trusts not only recognized a policy exception to spend-
thrift trusts for judgment creditors for alimony and child support, but it also recognized, due to a
perceived similarity between spendthrift and support trusts, the exception of support trusts. (For
the definition of a support trust, see supra note 2; see also infra this note.). Two Wisconsin cases
decided shortly after Schwager, with analogous fact patterns (except that they dealt with support
trusts), reveal that the same perceived similarity between spendthrift and support trusts existed in
Wisconsin during the 1940s. In Kirsten v. Czyz, No. 169,314 (Mi. C.C. of Wis., Nov. 1, 1940),
for example, the circuit court of Milwaukee County took a view opposite from that of the Seventh
Circuit and held that spendthrift trust provisions in support trusts are invalid in favor of judgment
creditors for child support. According to the court: "In so far as the provisions of the trust may
be construed as indicating an intention to prohibit the payment by the beneficiary of support
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Therefore, Wisconsin case law prior to the enactment of Section 701.06
upheld the validity of spendthrift trusts and refused to find a public policy
exception, absent legislation, to permit judgment creditors for alimony and
child support to reach the beneficial interest of a spendthrift trust - at least
where the trust's terms "expressly" precluded the beneficiary's divorced
spouse and children from reaching the interest. The issue remained open,
however, as to whether the beneficiary's divorced spouse and children could
reach the beneficial interest of a spendthrift trust with general terms, i.e.,
terms which precluded all voluntary and involuntary alienation, but con-
tained no express prohibitions against the use of the trust for alimony or
child support.65
The public support exception to the spendthrift trust doctrine was con-
sidered by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Will of Wright.66 In this case
the State Department of Public Welfare sought to reach the beneficial inter-
est of a spendthrift trust which had been set up primarily to benefit an in-
competent who was institutionalized in the Chippewa County Insane
money for his minor and dependent children, such provisions are contrary to public policy and
cannot be held valid." Id. at 3.
Four years later, however, the issue with respect to alimony judgment creditors was before the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Will of Razall, 245 Wis. 416, 14 N.W.2d 764 (1944). Relying on
Schwager, the court upheld a support trust with a specific prohibition against the use of the trust
income or principal for alimony or support of the beneficiary's wife. Id. at 416-17, 14 N.W.2d at
764.
The Restatement and Wisconsin courts were not alone in perceiving a similarity between sup-
port and spendthrift trusts; Professor Griswold had the same perception:
[A support] trust is not strictly a spendthrift trust, because it does not involve an interest
absolutely owing to the beneficiary, but subject to express restraints on alienation. The
limitation of the extent of the beneficiary's interest, however, shows with relative clarity
the intention of the settlor that the interest should be inalienable. Accordingly, the courts
have held quite uniformly that the interest of the beneficiary of such a trust is not subject to
his voluntary alienation and cannot be reached by his creditors.
E. GRISWOLD, supra note 18, § 431, at 507.
Despite the desire by the above authorities to treat support trusts as implied spendthrift trusts,
this Comment treats spendthrift and support trusts differently. A distinction is made because
separate policy interests may exist for allowing creditors to reach a spendthrift trust, where the
beneficiary has an absolute interest, and a support trust, where this absolute interest is lacking.
Therefore, the focus of this Comment is strictly on express spendthrift trusts; a discussion of
whether creditors should be able to reach the beneficial interests of support trusts is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
65. Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court faced this issue in Dillon, the holding could not
be recorded as Wisconsin law. Rather, due to a conflicts of law issue, the decision, which permit-
ted the divorced wife and children to reach the spendthrift trust interest, was really the result of
an application of Pennsylvania law. But cf Comment, supra note 22, at 173 (author states that
the Dillon court seemed to consider "the law of Wisconsin to be the same as that of
Pennsylvania").
66. 12 Wis. 2d 375, 107 N.W.2d 146 (1961).
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67Asylum wholly at public expense. Although the court concluded that the
State Department was entitled to none of the trust interest because the set-
tlor was not liable for the support of the incompetent, 68 this conclusion
seemed to imply that if the settlor had been liable for the beneficiary's sup-
port, the State Department could have successfully reached the trust
interest.69
C. The Effects of Section 701.06
Since there were no true exceptions to the spendthrift trust doctrine
prior to the adoption of Section 701.06 in 1971, this statute's adoption rep-
resented a revolutionary about-face with respect to the rights of creditors in
Wisconsin. This statute demonstrated the Wisconsin Legislature's belief,
contrary to earlier court decisions, that certain public policy interests out-
weighed the theory behind the spendthrift doctrine.70 With respect to cred-
itors for child support, for example, Wisconsin case law prior to the
enactment of Section 701.06 held that spendthrift trusts which "expressly"
precluded a beneficiary's children from reaching the trust interest were ab-
solute and not void as contrary to public policy.71 Under subsection
701.06(4), however, creditors for child support can clearly reach the benefi-
cial interest in a spendthrift trust.72
Other public policy advances with respect to the rights of creditors can
be found in subsection 701.06(5), which completely invalidates a spendthrift
67. Id. at 376-77, 107 N.W.2d at 147.
68. Id. at 382, 107 N.W.2d at 150.
69. This conclusion and its implications were codified in Wisconsin in 1971. See Wis. STAT.
§§ 701.06(5), (5m) (text reprinted supra note 47).
70. The theory behind the spendthrift trust doctrine is cujus est dare, ejus est disponere - a
settlor should be able to do what he pleases with his property. See supra note 28 and accompany-
ing text.
71. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
72. Subsection 701.06(4) of the Wisconsin Statutes actually invalidates spendthrift provisions
when they operate to exclude creditors for child support. Note, however, that the exception does
not automatically result in the entire trust being immediately available to satisfy a child support
obligation. Rather, a child support obligation will only be satisfied at such time as the trustee is
required to make distributions of income and/or principal. See WIS. STAT. § 701.06(4)(a). More-
over, if the trust is a discretionary one, a child support obligation might never be satisfied. See
WIs. STAT. § 701.06(4)(b). Nevertheless, subsection 701.06(4) is an exception to the spendthrift
trust doctrine and it is designed to make a child support claimant's collection from the debtor
more likely.
Also note that nothing in the legislative history of Section 701.06 indicates why the legislature
did not include creditors for alimony or spousal support among the types of claimants which can
reach the beneficial interest of a spendthrift trust. See Wis. LEGis. REF. BUR., 1969 ch. 283. The
reasons why, however, as well as the issue regarding whether the legislature should include claim-
ants for alimony and/or spousal support among the exceptions in Section 701.06, are beyond the
scope of this Comment.
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trust which operates to preclude creditors for public support from reaching
the beneficial interest;73 subsection 701.06(6), which invalidates spendthrift
trusts created by the beneficiary, at least for judgment creditors;74 and sub-
section 701.06(2), which permits a judgment creditor to recover from the
beneficiary's interest in principal after the "payments of principal have be-
come due or payable to the beneficiary." '71
With its enactment of Section 701.06, therefore, the Wisconsin Legisla-
ture has effected a complete reversal in the law by accepting the theory that
certain public policy interests can outweigh the theory" behind the spend-
thrift trust doctrine. Thus, it is arguable that if the Legislature can be con-
vinced that the public policy reasons behind permitting tort claimants to
recover from a spendthrift trust interest outweigh the policy reasons for
upholding the validity of the spendthrift trust doctrine, then the Legislature
will surely amend Section 701.06 to include tort victims among the statute's
current exceptions.
IV. A TORT-CREDITOR EXCEPTION TO THE SPENDTHRIFT
TRUST DOCTRINE
A. The Status of Tort Victims Under Wisconsin's Spendthrift Trust Law
Although this Comment investigates whether Wisconsin should recog-
nize a tort-creditor exception to the spendthrift trust doctrine, it should be
noted that tort creditors already have certain rights under Wisconsin's
spendthrift trust law. Tort creditors, as judgment creditors,76 do have the
73. Subsection 701.06(5) codifies the holding of Wright by permitting a public support credi-
tor to recover from the trust if the settlor is legally obligated to pay for the public support of the
beneficiary. See supra notes 47, 52, 54 and accompanying text. (Note, however, that this excep-
tion, like the exception for child support creditors, does not automatically result in the entire trust
being available to satisfy a public support obligation.). But see Wis. STAT. § 701.06(5m), which
also codifies Wright (subsection 701.06(5) does not apply to all trusts for all disabled beneficiaries;
subsection 701.06(5m) sets forth a "luxury trust" exception to the public support exception to the
spendthrift trust doctrine).
Subsection 701.06(5) also allows creditors who have provided public support to the benefici-
ary's spouse and children, for whose support the beneficiary is legally obligated to pay, to reach
the spendthrift trust interest. Wis. STAT. § 701.06(5) (text reprinted supra note 47).
74. Wis. STAT. § 701.06(6) permits judgment creditors of a beneficiary, who is also the settlor
of a spendthrift trust, to reach the trust's interests. See supra note 47.
75. Id. § 701.06(2). This subsection provides greater rights to a creditor than does subsection
701.06(1), which gives creditors no rights at all to reach the "income" of a spendthrift trust.
Creditors under subsection 701.06(1) will have to wait until the income interest has been "paid
over" to the beneficiary before they can reach the income interest. Subsection 701.06(2) permits
judgment creditors to reach the "principal" as soon as the interest is due or payable. See supra
notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
76. For a definition of judgment creditor, see supra note 49.
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ability to reach the beneficial interest of a spendthrift trust under subsection
701.06(2);" however, this ability is severely limited. Tort creditors, as judg-
ment creditors, are only allowed to reach "payments of principal" that have
"become due or payable to the beneficiary."'78 In other words, tort creditors
are excluded from any income interest until it is actually paid over to the
beneficiary; therefore, under Wisconsin law, a spendthrift trust is never
completely void as contrary to public policy for tort creditors.79
The remainder of this Comment discusses whether the status of tort
creditors under Wisconsin's spendthrift law should be changed. Specifi-
cally, should the spendthrift trust continue to be enforceable as against tort
creditors, or should tort creditors, as are child and public support creditors,
be given absolute rights to reach the beneficial interest in a spendthrift
trust?80
B. Scholars Take Issue with the Common Law's Failure to Recognize the
Tort-Creditor Exception
Cases addressing whether tort creditors should be able to reach the ben-
eficial interest in a spendthrift trust, although scarce, overwhelmingly reject
an exception for tort victims.8 1 Nevertheless, legal scholars and commenta-
77. See Wis. STAT. § 701.06(2)(1987-88) (text reprinted supra note 47).
78. Id.
79. An exception to the statement that spendthrift trusts in Wisconsin are never void for tort
creditors is found in Section 701.06 of the Wisconsin Statutes, which states that a spendthrift trust
is void for tort creditors, as judgment creditors, but only when the settlor is also the beneficiary of
the trust interest. In situations where the settlor is not also the beneficiary, however, a spendthrift
trust is only void for claimants for child support (Wis. STAT. § 701.06(4)) and public support
(Wis. STAT. § 701.06(5)).
80. It is not the aim of this Comment to determine how and when a tort-creditor exception
would be recognized in Wisconsin, or whether or not a tort-creditor exception should be treated
exactly like the child and public support exceptions which do not automatically result in the entire
trust being immediately available to satisfy the obligation. Rather, the sole aim of this Comment
is to determine whether there should be a tort-creditor exception to the spendthrift trust doctrine
in Wisconsin.
81. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Boyle, 418 F. Supp. 406 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 567
F.2d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 956 (1978) (when tort creditor was settlor of
spendthrift trust, tort creditor could not reach the beneficial interest); Kirkpatrick v. United States
Nat'l Bank, 264 Or. 1, 502 P.2d 579 (1972) (although there are exceptions to the spendthrift
doctrine for alimony and child support creditors, precedent refusing to find a tort-creditor excep-
tion controls); Kirk v. Kirk, 254 Or. 44, 456 P.2d 1009 (1969) (beneficial interest of spendthrift
trust created by United States for Indian beneficiary held unattainable to satisfy judgment of tort
creditor of beneficiary); Davies v. Harrison, 3 Pa. D & C 481 (1923) (tort creditor, whose judg-
ment was rendered in a state other than Pennsylvania, was not allowed to reach beneficial interest
of spendthrift trust in satisfaction of judgment); see also Thackara v. Mintzer, 100 Pa. 151 (1882),
where the court, in upholding the absolute validity of a spendthrift trust, declared in dicta that
"[w]hether the judgment be for a breach of contract or for a tort, matters not." Id. at 154-55.
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tors have argued for a tort-creditor exception to the spendthrift trust doc-
trine since the early part of the century.82 One of the first and most
influential of these scholars was Professor Erwin N. Griswold,83 who be-
lieved tort victims, as involuntary creditors, were not the type of creditors
against whom spendthrift trusts were designed to protect.84 According to
Professor Griswold, spendthrift trusts were designed to protect beneficiaries
from their own improvidence, i.e., the claims of ordinary, "voluntary" con-
tract creditors. Hence, tort victims, as "involuntary" creditors, should be
able to reach the beneficial interest in a spendthrift trust.8"
Later scholars expanded Griswold's view to encompass other compel-
ling public policy considerations weighing in favor of a tort-creditor excep-
tion to the spendthrift trust doctrine. An excellent example of such a view
is found in Professor Scott's treatise on trusts:
In many of the cases in which it has been held that by the terms of
the trust the interest of a beneficiary may be put beyond the reach of
his creditors, the courts have laid some stress on the fact that the
creditors had only themselves to blame for extending credit to a per-
son whose interest under the trust had been put beyond their reach.
The courts have said that before extending credit [the creditors]
could have ascertained the extent and character of the debtor's re-
sources. Certainly, the situation of a tort creditor is quite different
from that of a contract creditor. A man who is about to be knocked
down by an automobile has no opportunity to investigate the credit
of the driver of the automobile and has no opportunity to avoid be-
ing injured no matter what the resources of the driver may be. It
may be argued that the settlor can properly impose such restrictions
as he chooses on the property that he gives. But surely he cannot
82. See G. BOGERT, supra note 20, § 224, at 468; E. GRISWOLD, supra note 18, § 365, at 442-
44; 2A A. SCOTT, supra note 20, § 157.5, at 220; Griswold, supra note 37, at 80-81; Note, supra
note 40; Note, supra note 2; Note, supra note 37.
83. Erwin N. Griswold (A.B. Oberlin College, 1925, A.M., 1925, LL.B., Harvard, 1928,
S.J.D., 1929) was a former adviser on trusts for the American Law Institute and a noted authority
on spendthrift trusts. Two of his works include Reaching the Interest of a Beneficiary of a Spend-
thrift Trust, 43 HARV. L. REV. 63 (1929), and SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS (1st ed. 1936) and (2d ed.
1947). See Contributors to the November Issue, 43 HARV. L. REV. 99 (1929).
84. See E. GRISWOLD, supra note 18, § 365, at 442-44; Griswold, supra note 37, at 80-81.
85. E. GRISWOLD, supra note 18, § 365, at 442-44; accord Griswold, supra note 37, at 80-81.
According to Professor Griswold, when the plaintiff who is seeking to reach the beneficial interest
in a spendthrift trust bases his claim on a tort committed by the beneficiary:
one of the chief arguments advanced in favor of spendthrift trusts falls to the ground. It
may be that the contract creditor had an opportunity to investigate the assets of his debtor
before he extended credit to him. But the person against whom the beneficiary commits a
tort certainly has no such opportunity.
Id. at 80.
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impose restrictions that are against public policy. It is true that the
tortfeasor may have no other property than that which is given him
under the trust, and that the victim of the tort is no worse off where
the tortfeasor has property that cannot be reached than he would be
if the tortfeasor has no property at all. Nevertheless, there seems to
be something rather shocking in the notion that a man should be al-
lowed to continue in the enjoyment of property without satisfying the
claims of persons whom he has injured. It may well be held that it is
against public policy to permit the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust to
enjoy an income under the trust without discharging his tort liabilities
to others.86
The principal argument against the tort-creditor exception is merely a
restatement of the theory behind the spendthrift trust doctrine, i.e., that the
settlor should be able to place whatever restrictions he wants on the benefi-
ciary's use of a spendthrift trust. 7 As was stated earlier in this Comment,
however, the judicial and legislative trend during the last several decades
has been to recognize public policy exceptions to the spendthrift doctrine. 8
Therefore, in light of these current public policy exceptions to the spend-
thrift trust doctrine, the principal argument against the tort creditor excep-
tion has little weight. Moreover, it can hardly be argued that tort creditors
belong more properly in a class outside the one comprised of the special
types of claimants for which these public policy exceptions have been cre-
ated. 9 In fact, the public policy reasons behind permitting a tort creditor
to reach the beneficial interest in a spendthrift trust are as strong, if not
86. 2A A. ScoTT, supra note 20, § 157.5, at 220 (emphasis added); see also G. BOGERT, supra
note 20, § 225, at 468; E. GRISWOLD, supra note 18, § 555, at 637; Note, supra note 40, at 221;
Note, supra note 2, at 513; Note supra note 37, at 236-37.
87. The Latin phrase for this theory is cujus est dare, ejus est disponere. See supra note 28 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this theory.
88. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 40, at 222-23,
where the author states that "statutes and decisions have erased the application" of cujus est dare,
ejus est disponere in many facets of the law. For example:
In Pennsylvania a testator may not make a devise for charitable purpose except by a will
executed a specified time before his death. Similarly the power of an owner is often limited
by statutory interests in lieu of dower or curtesy. The rule against perpetuities represents
another limitation on the property owner's right to dispose of his interest in whatever
manner he chooses.
Id.
89. See Note, supra note 2, at 515.
A sense of justice suggests that the tort claimant belongs more properly in the class of
other special claimants ... who have been permitted to recover their debts out of [the
beneficiary's] interest in the trust.
The view that the primary concern of the courts in the field of spendthrift trusts is not
to protect the spendthrift beneficiary but rather to uphold the settlor's right to dispose of
property as he sees fit has been seriously discredited. In addition to numerous statutes and
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stronger than, the public policies behind the existence of other exceptions.9 °
The American Law Institute (A.L.I.) agrees. For example, although a lack
of case law prevented the A.L.I. from including tort creditors as an express
exception to the spendthrift trust doctrine in its Restatement (Second) of
Trusts,9 the A.L.I. refused to ignore the tort-creditor exception:
The enumeration in this Section of situations in which the interest of
the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust.., can be reached is not neces-
sarily exclusive. The interest of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust
... may be reached in cases other than those herein enumerated, if
considerations of public policy so require. Thus it is possible that a
person who has a claim in tort against the beneficiary of a spendthrift
trust may be able to reach his interest under the trust.92
C. Refusal to Recognize a Tort-Creditor Exception Is Not Absolute
1. The Louisiana Legislature's Belief in the Exception
Section 2005 of the Louisiana Trust Code, which has adopted the tort-
creditor exception, provides:
Notwithstanding any stipulation in the trust instrument to the
contrary, the proper court, in summary proceedings to which the
trustee, the beneficiary, and the beneficiary's creditor shall be par-
ties, may permit seizure of any portion of the beneficiary's interest in
trust income and principal in its discretion and as may be just under
the circumstances if the claim is based upon a judgment for:
(1) Alimony, or maintenance of a person whom the beneficiary
is obligated to support;
(2) Necessary services rendered or necessary supplies furnished
to the beneficiary or to a person whom the beneficiary is obli-
gated to support; or
(3) An offense or quasi-offense committed by the beneficiary or by
a person for whose acts the beneficiary is individually
responsible.93
decisions which have detracted considerably from the idea of absolute immunity, the view
has also been sharply attacked by legal scholars.
The argument that the victim of a tort is actually in no worse position than if the tort-
feasor were penniless may be true in certain instances; nevertheless it is obviously unjust to
allow the beneficiary to continue enjoying his property while the injured tort claimant
remains unrecompensed.
Id.
90. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 (1959).
92. Id. comment a (emphasis added).
93. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2005 (West 1983) (emphasis added).
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The Louisiana Legislature, in enacting this provision as a part of the
Louisiana Trust Estates Act of 1938,"4 followed the model spendthrift trust
statute proposed by Professor Griswold in his treatise on spendthrift
trusts.95 Professor Griswold's model statute provided in relevant part:
Where the claim of the creditor is for (1) the support of a husband,
wife or child of the beneficiary, or for alimony, (2) necessary services
rendered or necessary supplies furnished to the beneficiary, (3) a
tort, or (4) is based on a judgment for any such claim, the court shall
have power to make such an order directing the payment of income
to such creditor .... 96
Although Louisiana is the only state to adopt such a tort-creditor excep-
tion,9 7 at least one commentator believes Louisiana did the right thing:
98
Louisiana made a wise policy decision when it allowed those who
have been injured by another to reach his interest in the trust. Part
of the reasoning behind restricting involuntary alienation is that
creditors should investigate those persons to whom they grant
credit. Certainly the injured party is not in the position to investi-
94. See Comment, supra note 37. "Although the original statute did not allow restriction of
alienation of the interest in principal, it was amended in 1944 to allow such a restriction. In 1964
the Trust Estates Act was replaced by the Louisiana Trust Code, which continues to recognize
spendthrift trusts." Id. at 391.
95. Id. at 391 n.2. The first edition of Professor Griswold's treatise on spendthrift trusts,
which included the model statute after which Louisiana patterned its statute, was published in
1936. See Note, supra note 2, at 516 n.42.
96. E. GRISWOLD, supra note 18, § 565, at 648 (emphasis added).
Prior to the 1964 replacement of the Louisiana Trust Estates Act, the Louisiana provision
corresponding with Professor Griswold's model provision stated in relevant part that:
the proper court had power to direct the payment of income to a creditor as might be just
under the circumstances if the claim was for the support of a husband, wife, or child of the
beneficiary, for alimony, for necessary supplies furnished the beneficiary, or for a tort, or if
the claim was based upon a judgment for such a claim.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2005 comments-Louisiana State Law Institute (emphasis added).
97. It is interesting to note that Oklahoma also patterned its spendthrift statute after Profes-
sor Griswold's model draft. However, of Professor Griswold's suggested exceptions to the spend-
thrift doctrine, the tort-creditor exception was the only one excluded by the Oklahoma
Legislature. See Note, supra note 37, at 238.
That this should be the provision of the Oklahoma statute is surprising in light of the
fact that it was adopted in full from a model statute drafted by Professor Griswold whose
work included the tort claimant exception. While no records are available to tell us what
considerations moved the legislature to delete this provision, it is to be hoped that the
decision will be reconsidered.
Id.
98. It can be assumed, however, that in light of the public policy reasons set forth by other
legal scholars and commentators in support of the tort-creditor exception, this one commentator
is not the only supporter of the Louisiana statute.
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gate and, as a policy matter, should be allowed to recover for his
injuries from the beneficiary's interest in the trust.99
2. Common Law Hope for the Tort-Creditor Exception
Ironically, one ray of common law hope for the tort-creditor exception
emanates from a 1976 Federal District Court decision which is usually cited
as authority opposing the tort-creditor exception. In United Mine Workers
ofAmerica v. Boyle,"° the court held that where the tort victim and spend-
thrift trust settlor are the same, the tort victim cannot reach the beneficial
interest of the trust.10 l However, notwithstanding this holding, the court
also hinted, in dicta, that had the tort victim and trust settlor not been the
same, the tort victim may have been able to reach the beneficial interest:
While it can scarcely be denied that there is something shocking
in the notion that a settlor may be permitted to immure a benefici-
ary's interest from the lawful claims of third-party tort creditors by
the device of a spendthrift trust, we believe that the considerations
are different in a case... in which the tort victim and trust settlor
are one and the same person.
Unlike the hypothetical third-party tort victim, a settlor can pre-
serve his rights against the beneficiary's interest in the trust by cir-
cumspection in drafting the trust instrument."°2
In other words, the trust settlor, unlike a third-party tort creditor,
"could easily have guaranteed the availability of the defendant's beneficial
interests for purposes of satisfying a judgment [in favor of the settlor] based
upon a tort committed by the beneficiary against the [settlor]."' 3 Accord-
ing to the court's analysis, therefore, a third-party tort creditor, who has no
way to guarantee the availability of the defendant's beneficial interest in
favor of a judgment, should be able to reach the beneficial interest.
Another ray of common law hope for the tort-creditor exception ema-
nates from the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA")
area."° The exception's progress, which began positively and with great
potential, soon became trapped in a series of court debates. The positive
99. Comment, supra note 37, at 402 n.57 (citing LA. CIv. CODE ANN., arts. 2315, 2318; E.
GRISWOLD, supra note 18, § 365, at 442-44; 2 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 157.5, at 1230-
31 (3d ed. 1967)); see also Note, supra note 2, at 517.
100. 418 F. Supp. 406 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd, 567 F.2d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 956 (1978).
101. Id. at 411.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. According to subsection 206(d) of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security
Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1976), pension plans are required to prohibit the assign-
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beginning was marked by the lower court's decision in Helmsley-Spear, Inc.
v. Winter.1" 5 Basing its decision on the recognition of a "widely-accepted"
tort-creditor exception to the spendthrift trust doctrine, this 1979 New
York supreme court held that the beneficial interest of an ERISA pension
trust could be reached by a judgment creditor for fraud. According to the
court: "If a spendthrift trust is available to satisfy a tort claim, it would be
a fortiori inequitable to allow one who has been convicted of stealing from
his employer to invoke such a provision to escape his obligations to make
whole the employer who has suffered the depredations."10 6
The debate began, however, when the Helmsley-Spear, Inc. appellate
court rejected the tort-creditor exception:
It is argued that the statutory exemptions should not apply to
the claims of tort creditors, and particularly to the claims of tort
creditors who are settlors of the allegedly exempt trust. We see
nothing in the statutes carving out such an exception. And we note
"strong public policy against forfeiture of employee benefits mani-
fested by [ERISA]." I 7
Just when it appeared that hope for the tort-creditor exception was lost
in the ERISA area, another ray of hope appeared in the Eleventh Circuit.
In St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Cox, °10 the court held, contrary to
ment or alienation of plan benefits. In other words, ERISA requires pension plan trusts to be
spendthrift trusts. The reason is as follows:
Since the interest of a trust beneficiary is generally regarded as a property right and liable
for the beneficiary's debts along with his legal interests, unless exempted by direction of the
settlor or by statute, there is a danger that funds in a pension trust intended to be made
available to a participant at retirement may long since have been appropriated by his credi-
tors.
Section 206(d) of ERISA is Congress' response to this problem. In order to ensure that
the benefits that have accrued to a participant are available to him at retirement, every
pension plan (with certain unimportant exceptions) is now required to prohibit the assign-
ment or alienation of plan benefits.
Sherman, Spendthrift Trusts and Employee Pensions: The Problem of Creditors' Rights, 55 IND.
L.J. 247, 247-48 (1980) (citing, among other sources, H.R. REP. No. 807, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 68
(1974), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4670, 4734 (1974)).
105. 74 A.D.2d 195, 426 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1980), modifying 101 Misc. 2d 17, 420 N.Y.S.2d 599
(1979), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 986, 419 N.E.2d 1078, 438 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1981).
106. Helmsley-Spear, Inc, 101 Misc. 2d at - 420 N.Y.S.2d at 601 (emphasis added). It is
interesting to note that this lower court's recognition of a "widely accepted" tort-creditor excep-
tion was not based on any case law; rather, the exception was based on the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TRusTs § 157 comment a (1959) and 2 A. ScoTr, supra note 99 § 157.5, at 1230.
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 101 Misc. 2d at -, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
107. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 74 A.D.2d at _, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 781 (citing Post v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 48 N.Y.2d 84, 88, 397 N.E.2d 358, 360, 421 N.Y.S.2d 847,
849 (1979)).
108. 583 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd, 752 F.2d 550 (11th Cir. 1985).
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Helmsley-Spear, Inc., that the beneficial interest of the pension trust could
be reached by a judgment-creditor employer for fraud.'1 9 Actually, the
court recognized a "criminal misconduct" exception to ERISA's spend-
thrift provision requirement:
The insulation of an employee from liability for the consequences of
his criminal misconduct does not protect the financial interests of
other employees or promote security in the workplace. On the con-
trary, in such cases garnishment of the employee's fund interest best
serves the financial stability of the employer and, indirectly, the em-
ployer's pension plan. There is no reason to conclude that ERISA
requires the abrogation of the equitable principle that a wrong doer
should not benefit from his misdeeds.110
The Second Circuit, however, in Ellis National Bank of Jacksonville v.
Irving Trust Co., 111 strongly disagreed with the Eleventh Circuit's holding:
Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit's holding, we think that even a nar-
row judicially created "criminal misconduct" exception would un-
dermine, rather than promote, the stability of the pension plan and
its employee members by creating uncertainty and potentially
delayed receipt or non-receipt of promised benefits.
... [W]e note that the creation of a "criminal misconduct" ex-
ception would lead to serious questions regarding the scope of the
exception, which would likely be resolved only through a "boundless
stream of suits and disputes." Would the exception be available to
only employers or pension plans, or also to third parties allegedly
victimized, such as creditors, the government or even other employ-
ees? Would the exception withstand a charge that it would favor busi-
ness tort claimants over creditors? Would it pave the way for
exceptions for noncriminal fraud or conversion?
We decline to alter the Congressional scheme in ERISA regard-
ing pensions .... 112
While this court debate has led at least one legal scholar to conclude
that the tort-creditor exception has no chance of success in the ERISA
area,113 the exception is not totally hopeless, especially in light of the Elev-
enth Circuit's holding114 and the fact that ERISA's spendthrift provisions
are not absolute. For example, notwithstanding the Second Circuit's reluc-
109. Cox, 752 F.2d at 552.
110. Id. (emphasis added).
111. 786 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 3312 (1989).
112. Id. at 471-72 (emphasis added) (quoting Vink v. SHV N. Am. Holding Corp., 549 F.
Supp. 268, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (emphasis added)).
113. See 2A A. ScoTr, supra note 20, § 157.5, at 222 n.1.
114. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
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tance to "alter the Congressional scheme" regarding the availability of pen-
sion trusts for participants, 1 5 the Second Circuit recognized an alimony
exception to ERISA spendthrift provisions.' 6 Moreover, other jurisdic-
tions have adopted similar public policy exceptions, i.e., for child support,
as well."17 Therefore, since certain types of claimants have been able to
reach pension trusts despite ERISA's provisions, the tort-creditor excep-
tion, as a public policy exception, still has a chance in the ERISA area." 8
D. Public Policy Analogies Outside the Law of Trusts
Although the rights of tort victims have scarcely been recognized in the
spendthrift trust area, there are areas of the law which have bestowed spe-
cial status upon tort creditors - a status which translates into increased
rights for tort victims because public policy favors the economic and physi-
cal restoration of injured persons. The focus of this section is upon the laws
of federal and state income tax, insurance, and bankruptcy, three legal areas
which have embraced the public policy just described and can be analogized
to the spendthrift trust area and its treatment of tort creditors.
115. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
116. American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979).
117. See, eg., Bowen v. Bowen, 715 F.2d 559 (1lth Cir. 1983) (alimony); Senco of Fla., Inc.
v. Clark, 473 F. Supp. 902 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (child support); Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp.
1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (alimony); Ward v. Ward, 164 N.J. Super. 354, 396 A.2d 365 (1978) (child
support). See generally Sherman, supra note 104.
118. The conclusion that the tort-creditor exception has been unsuccessful thus far in the
ERISA area could have been strong ammunition for opponents of the tort-creditor exception in
the ordinary spendthrift trust area. However, doubt regarding the validity of spendthrift trusts in
the ERISA area has greatly diminished the conclusion's potential impact as an anti-tort-creditor
exception argument. Questions regarding the validity of ERISA trusts, for example, have re-
volved primarily around self-settled pension trusts.
It is uniformly held at common law that where the settlor of a spendthrift trust is also a
beneficiary of the trust, the spendthrift provision will not insulate his interest from the
claims of his creditors, since "[iut is against public policy to permit a man to Tm (from )Tj
524it hisown




Sherman, supra note 104, at 261 (quoting 2 A. Scorr, supra note 99, § 156, at 1191).
Therefore, since pension plans frequently permit or require employees to make contributions
to the pension trusts, the issue is whether the courts should adopt the self-settled trust exception
to the spendthrift trust doctrine in the ERISA area so that, notwithstanding ERISA's spendthrift
requirement, a creditor of an employee can reach the employee's beneficial interest in the spend-
thrift pension trust. Id. at 261. Since the issue is far from settled, therefore, opponents of the tort-
creditor exception should probably seek arguments stronger than the common 
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1. The Rights of Tort Victims Under Federal and State Income Tax
Law
Under subsection 104(a)(2) of the 1986 Internal Revenue Code
("I.R.C."), damages received on account of personal injuries are excluded
from gross income. 19 Interpreting this I.R.C. provision, the Treasury Reg-
ulations state that the term "damages" includes all amounts received which
are "based upon tort or tort type rights."' 120 Therefore, the damages re-
ceived by a tort victim are not subject to the federal income tax.' 2' More-
over, most states, including Wisconsin, 122 recognize the same personal
injury exclusion. 123
The exclusion of tort damages from gross income was adopted by Con-
gress (and state legislatures), to ensure the economic and physical restora-
tion of tort victims to the position in which they would have been, had the
tort never been committed.124 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has gone one
step further by holding that the purpose of the exclusion was not solely to
compensate, but also to confer a "benefit" upon tort victims, i.e., to restore
victims to a position better than the one they occupied prior to the tort. 125
119. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1986) provides that "gross income does not include.., the amount
of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic
payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness." Id.
120. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1970). According to the Tax Court of the United States, how-
ever, the torts involved are only those "classified as an action for personal injuries." Threlkeld v.
Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294, 1307 (1986).
121. Under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), recoveries for both intentional and unintentional torts re-
ceived on account of personal injuries are excluded from gross income. J. FREELAND, S. LIND &
R. STEPHENS, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 184 (6th ed. 1987) [hereinafter
J. FREELAND]. For an excellent discussion of how subsection 104(a)(2) of the I.R.C. specifically
applies to tort damages, see L. FROLIK, FEDERAL TAX ASPECTS OF INJURY, DAMAGE, AND Loss
ch. 1 (1987).
122. Wis. STAT. § 71.01(4) (1987-88).
123. W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, TORTS 551 (7th ed. 1982).
124. See, e.g., Bradford, Measuring Tort Damages for Loss of Earnings Without Deducting
Income Taxes: A Wisconsin Rule Which Lost Its Rationale, 70 MARQ. L. REv. 210 (1987):
The relationship of taxes to damages is readily apparent when the general theory of
damages is considered. In Wisconsin, damages are ordinarily awarded to compensate a
plaintiff for losses sustained as a result of a defendant's tort. To quantify the plaintiff's
loss, it is necessary to consider the purpose to be achieved by the award of damages. Pro-
fessor McCormick states in his treatise on damages: "In a case of tort ... the general
purpose of compensation is to give a sum of money to the person wronged which, as nearly
as possible, will restore him to the position he would be in if the wrong had not been
committed."
Id. at 214-15 (citing Fee v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 17 Wis. 2d 364, 365, 117 N.W.2d 269, 270
(1962), rev'd on other grounds, In re Estate of Stromsted, 99 Wis. 2d 136, 299 N.W.2d 226 (1980)
(quoting C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 137, at 560-61 (1935)).
125. See Bradford, supra note 124. Although Wisconsin agrees with the view that damages
are designed to compensate a tort victim, the Wisconsin Supreme Court nevertheless ruled that
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Regardless of the jurisdiction, however, subsection 104(a)(2) rests "on the
compassionate thought that the taxpayer has suffered enough .... [A] tax-
payer who has incurred personal injury should not additionally suffer."1 26
Therefore, if tort creditors are given special rights and recognition
under the tax codes, including Wisconsin's, why has not the law recognized
a tort-creditor exception to the spendthrift doctrine? By permitting a
tortfeasor, who is the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust, to keep his wealth
out of the hands of the tort victims whom the beneficiary has injured, the
law is preventing the aim of damages, i.e., the restoration of tort victims to
a position in which they would have been had the tort never been commit-
ted, from being realized. Moreover, such permission is also causing tort
victims to suffer more than they would if the trust interest was obtainable
by the victims. 127 Clearly, this is contrary to the policies behind subsection
104(a)(2). More importantly, however, the result is contrary to Wisconsin's
view that the exclusion of personal injury damages from gross income is
designed to confer a "benefit" upon tort victims. If Wisconsin believes tort
creditors are entitled to a benefit above and beyond compensation in the
damages awarded for lost earnings in tort actions are not to be reduced by taxes which would have
been payable on such earnings had the tort not occurred. Id. at 210 (citing Hardware Mut. Casu-
alty Co. v. Harry Crow & Son, Inc., 6 Wis. 2d 396, 94 N.W.2d 577 (1959)). Part of the reason for
the Wisconsin court's conclusion rests on the theory that Congress, in enacting I.R.C. subsection
104(a)(2), intended to confer a "benefit" on injured parties - a benefit which includes approxi-
mating the plaintiff's gross earnings in determining tort damages. Id. at 219.
Additional support for the conclusion that the purpose behind subsection 104(a)(2) was to
ensure the economic and physical restoration of tort victims can be found in the Internal Revenue
Service's ("IRS") contention that the exclusion for damages for personal injuries does not apply to
punitive damages. Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32. According to the IRS, since "punitive dam-
ages are not a substitute for any injury to the Plaintiff or Plaintiff's property, but are extracted
from the wrongdoer as punishment for unlawful conduct," they are included in gross income. Id.
at 34. "[D]amages paid for personal injuries are excluded from gross income under subsection
104(a)(2) of the Code because, in effect, they restore a loss of capital. An award of punitive
damages, however, does not compensate a taxpayer for a loss but adds to the taxpayer's wealth."
Id.
126. J. FREELAND, supra note 121, at 183.
127. This conclusion is true even in situations where the tort damages are greater than the
amount in the spendthrift trust. For example, if the law refuses to permit tort victims to reach
whatever they can from the beneficial interest - even if it is less than the amount needed to
restore them to a pre-tort position - the law would still be preventing the aim of damages from
being realized to the greatest extent possible, and it would still be causing tort victims to suffer
more than they would have to if the trust interest was obtainable. Granted, tort victims would
still suffer if they could not recover the entire amount of their damages, but they would suffer less
if they could reach whatever interest was available than they would if they could reach nothing
from the trust.
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income tax area, then how can Wisconsin deny tort creditors their just com-
pensation in the spendthrift trust area? 28
2. Analogies in the Insurance Law Area
The public policy interest in favor of promoting the economic and phys-
ical restoration of injured persons is especially prevalent in insurance legis-
lation. During the last several decades, for example, there has clearly been
a legislative shift in focus in the property/casualty liability insurance area
from the protection of the insured's assets to the protection and well-being
of accident victims. 129 Wisconsin's legislation is particularly demonstrative
of this shift. 13° As Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Shirley Abrahamson
stated:
Our society regards the victim as a beneficiary of the insurance
contract. Insurance is considered by both the insured and society as
a means of compensating the injured person. As Professor Robert
E. Keeton wrote, "liability insurance has come to be used openly
and extensively as a device for insuring compensation to victims." It
is well recognized that liability insurance is purchased by the first-
party insured not only to protect the insured's assets but also to pro-
vide financial protection to anyone injured by the insured.
Legislative endorsement of this societal construction of insurance
is shown by the enactment of direct action statutes, compulsory au-
tomobile liability insurance laws, and financial responsibility laws.
These laws are predicated on the theory that the third-party victim
is a third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract. [These laws]
can be read.., as legislative recognition of the victim as an intended
beneficiary of the insurance policy.
131
128. The Wisconsin Legislature's failure to permit tort creditors to reach the beneficial inter-
ests of their tortfeasors' spendthrift trust is also contrary to the view espoused by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, i.e., that damages for personal injury should at least "compensate a plaintiff for
losses sustained as a result of a defendant's tort." Bradford, supra note 124, at 214-15 (citing Fee,
17 Wis. 2d at 365, 117 N.W.2d at 270).
129. See generally J. HAMMITT, R. HOUCHENS, S. POLIN & J. ROLPH, AUTOMOBILE AcCI-
DENT COMPENSATION (1985) [hereinafter J. HAMMiTr]; INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
INSURANCE FACTS 1988-89 PROPERTY CASUALTY FACT BOOK (1988) [hereinafter INSURANCE
FACTS]; R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW (1971).
130. For an excellent discussion of Wisconsin's insurance laws, see A. ANDERSON, WISCON-
SIN INSURANCE LAW (2d ed. 1986).
131. Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Casualty Co., 103 Wis. 2d 56, 90, 307 N.W.2d 256, 273
(1981) (Abrahamson, J., concurring) (quoting R. KEETON, supra note 129, at 233 (citing 4A
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 807, at 213-16 (1951))).
Some of the Wisconsin Statutes to which Justice Abrahamson referred include: WIS. STAT.
§ 803.04(2) (1987-88) (Wisconsin Direct Action Statute which allows third party victims to pro-
ceed against the insurer directly regardless of whether the liability is presently established or con-
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In addition to the statutes recognized by Justice Abrahamson, there is
one statute which not only demonstrates the legislature's endorsement of
the public policy favoring the restoration of accident victims, but which,
ironically, also serves to demonstrate the negative implications a lack of a
tort-creditor exception to the spendthrift trust doctrine may have. Chapter
619 of the Wisconsin Statutes, entitled "Risk Sharing Plans,"' 132 makes in-
surance available to those in the residual market, i.e., those who are unable
for whatever reason to obtain insurance in the voluntary market.133 An
example of one of the plans which exists pursuant to Chapter 619 is the
Wisconsin Automobile Insurance Plan ("A.I.P."), which provides automo-
bile insurance to those in the residual market. 134 The A.I.P., however, pro-
tingent and to become fixed or certain by final judgment against the insured); Wis. STAT. ch. 344
(1987-88) (Wisconsin Financial Responsibility Laws, under which a driver who has been in an
accident may be required, as a condition precedent to being licensed to drive in Wisconsin, to
provide proof of financial responsibility, i.e., proof of ability to respond in damages for liability);
Wis. STAT. § 601.01(2) (1987-88) (the purposes of the Insurance Law statutes are "[t]o ensure
that policyholders, claimants and insurers are treated fairly and equitably"); Wis. STAT. § 632.35
(1987-88) ("No insurer may cancel or refuse to issue or renew an automobile insurance policy
wholly or partially because of one or more of the following characteristics of any person: age, sex,
residence, race, color, creed, religion, national origin, ancestry, marital status or occupation.").
Other Wisconsin statutory provisions which are demonstrative of the shift toward protection
and restoration of the accident victim: Wis. STAT. § 632.22 (1987-88) (all liability insurance poli-
cies must contain a provision that the bankruptcy or insolvency of the insured shall not diminish
the insurer's liability); see also Wis. STAT. § 344.33(2) (1987-88) (required minimum coverage for
every motor vehicle liability insurance policy is as follows: "$25,000 because of bodily injury to or
death of one person in any one accident and, subject to such limit for one person, $50,000 because
of bodily injury to or death of 2 or more persons in any one accident, and $10,000 because of
injury to or destruction of property of others in any one accident"); Wis. STAT. § 632.32(6)(b)
(1987-88) (certain exclusions from motor vehicle insurance prohibited).
132. Wis. STAT. ch. 619 (1987-88).
133. The voluntary market is also referred to in the insurance profession as the standard or
normal market.
According to the 1969 Committee Comment which prefaces Wis. STAT. ANN. ch. 619, the
risk sharing plans were prompted by investigations that "demonstrated that critical residual mar-
kets do exist. Not all Wisconsin residents can obtain the insurance protection they need to use
automobiles, operate businesses or even to protect their residences." Id. Committee Comment.
134. See Wisconsin Automobile Insurance Plan ("A.I.P.") Manual (1987), a copy of which
can be obtained for a minimum fee from the Automobile Insurance Plan Service Office, 302 Cen-
tral Avenue, Johnston, Rhode Island 02919-4995, which distributes the Manual on behalf of the
Wisconsin Automobile Insurance Plan, 790 North Milwaukee Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
53202. A revised Wisconsin A.I.P. Manual was released in late 1989.
Although the A.I.P. became effective on October 1, 1949, it currently exists pursuant to Sec-
tion 619.01 of the Wisconsin Statutes, as required by Section 3.49 of the Wisconsin Insurance
Administrative Code. According to the Code, Section 3.49 "interprets [Wis. STAT. § 619.01] to
continue a plan to make automobile insurance available to those who are unable to obtain it in the
voluntary market by providing for the equitable distribution of applicants among insurers and
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vides only the statutory minimum automobile insurance coverage.131
Therefore, while the Wisconsin Legislature has recognized the need to pro-
tect the public from those who would normally drive without insurance, it
may not be protecting the public enough - especially in light of the nega-
tive implications which may be created by the lack of a tort-creditor excep-
tion to the spendthrift trust doctrine.
Suppose, for example, a 20-year-old bad risk driver ("Driver") is a
spendthrift and is completely penniless but for a $200,000 spendthrift trust
from which he is entitled to $1,000 of the income interest monthly. Driver
has had so many accidents and traffic violations during the last several
years that no insurance company would have covered him if it were not for
Wisconsin's A.I.P. Under the A.I.P., Driver is able to get automobile cov-
erage, even though he was unable to get insurance in the standard market.
The coverage, however, is minimal - only $25,000 per accident when one
person is injured and $50,000 per accident when two or more are injured. 136
One day, Driver collides with and injures A, so that A requires six months
of hospitalization and medical treatment. Her bills total more than
$150,000. Although Driver is found to be at fault, and A obtains a judg-
ment against Driver, A will get nothing from Driver except for his nominal
$25,000 of insurance proceeds. 137 Driver's spendthrift trust interest is unat-
tainable by A since Wisconsin has not yet recognized a tort-creditor excep-
tion to the spendthrift trust doctrine. Therefore, while A is stuck with
outlines access and grievance procedures for such a plan." Wis. ADMIN. CODE § Ins. 3.49 (Sept.
1986).
Wisconsin joins the majority of states which have adopted plans that provide insurance to
those in the residuary market. See INSURANCE FACTS, supra note 129, at 42.
The insurance industry has established mechanisms in every state to provide automobile
insurance for drivers who, for whatever reason, are unable to obtain coverage in the volun-
tary market. The first of the shared market mechanisms was established in New Hamp-
shire in 1938. Today, all 50 states and the District of Columbia use one of four systems to
guarantee the availability of auto insurance.
Id.; see also J. HAMMITr, supra note 129, at 21-22.
135. According to subsection 10(A)(1) of Wisconsin's A.I.P. Rules, "[e]ach insurer shall be
required to write a policy or binder for basic limits of $25,000/50,000 Bodily Injury and $10,000
Property Damage or, upon request, a policy with a Combined Single Unit of $60,000." Id. at 3.
Moreover, "[a]n insured assigned under the Plan may, at his or her option, also purchase addi-
tional coverage to be written in the same policy." Id. § 10(A)(2). The $25,000/50,000/10,000 is
the Wisconsin statutory minimum for all motor vehicle insurance policies. See Wis. STAT.
§ 344.33 (1987-88).
136. Driver could not afford to purchase any additional insurance coverage as is permitted
under A.I.P. subsection 10(A)(2). See supra note 135.
137. Granted, under subsection 701.06(1), A would be entitled to Driver's $1,000 of monthly
trust income after it is actually paid over to Driver. WIs. STAT. § 701.06(1). However, because
Driver is a spendthrift (under the facts of this example), collection from Driver is highly unlikely.
[Vol. 73:109
SPENDTHRIFT TRUST DOCTRINE
thousands of dollars of unpaid medical bills, Driver continues to live off the
security of his beneficial spendthrift trust interest. In other words, Driver
has escaped his tort liability, and A, as an innocent tort victim, remains
uncompensated, even though an abundance of Driver's assets are in exist-
ence. Even if A, as a judgment creditor, seeks a court order under subsec-
tion 701.06(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes to reach the trust principal as it
becomes due and payable, 3 ' A will never be fully compensated because the
trust provisions mandate only distributions of income to Driver."'
The inconsistency between such a result and the public policy favoring
the compensation of accident victims evidenced by Wisconsin's insurance
legislation is apparent. If the law continues its failure to recognize a tort-
creditor exception to the spendthrift trust doctrine, the law will be provid-
ing a license to bad risk drivers (and other tortfeasors) with few or no assets
but a spendthrift trust interest, to injure others, free of charge."4 A tort-
creditor exception to the spendthrift trust doctrine is needed, therefore, to
keep Wisconsin's laws and public policies consistent and equitable.
3. Tort Creditors and Bankruptcy Law
Another public policy interest weighing in favor of tort creditors ema-
nates in part from federal bankruptcy law and deals with choses in
action: 141
Legislatures have long recognized the public interest in promoting
the economic and physical restoration of injured persons to prevent
138. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
139. Again, it is not the aim of the Comment to determine how a tort-creditor exception
should be applied in Wisconsin. See supra note 80. However, if it is applied exactly like the
exceptions for child and public support creditors, the most to which A would be entitled would be
Driver's $1000 monthly trust income - payable directly from the trustee to A; this means that
while A would not be fully compensated for at least ten years, A is clearly much better off than if
there were no tort-creditor exception.
140. A lack of a tort-creditor exception to the spendthrift trust doctrine can yield similar
negative implications in the punitive damages area. Since punitive damages are designed to pun-
ish and deter those whose conduct was willful and wanton, what will happen when an intentional
tortfeasor, whose only source of assets is a spendthrift trust, is required to pay punitive damages to
his intentional tort victim? If the tort victim is unable to reach his tortfeasor's beneficial interest,
he will not only escape liability for punitive damages, he will escape punishment and deterrence as
well. Clearly, this cannot be what the Wisconsin legislature intended.
For an in-depth discussion of punitive damages, see C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF DAMAGES § 79 (1935). For an in-depth discussion of punitive damages in Wisconsin, see
J. GHIARDI AND J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE (1984); see also Brown
v. Maxey, 124 Wis. 2d 426, 369 N.W.2d 677 (1985).
141. According to Black's Law Dictionary, a chose in action is a "[rlight to receive or recover




their becoming a charge on society. This policy is considered so im-
portant in the case of bodily injuries that choses in action for these
injuries are commonly made inalienable as a matter of legislative
policy. [The Bankruptcy Act is an example.] If this policy is strong
enough that we should prohibit its defeat by the voluntary alienation
of the chose in action by the plaintiff, should it not also be strong
enough to preclude its defeat by the person who has caused the
injury?142
A final example of the increased rights tort creditors have received in
other areas of the law are bankruptcy discharges. 143 Section 523 of the Fed-
eral Bankruptcy Act ("Act") recognizes the rights of tort creditors, but lim-
its the specialized status to those injured by intentional torts.14  For
example, under subsection 523(a)(6), a debtor who has caused "willful and
malicious" injuries to another is not permitted to discharge the debt owed
to such tort victim creditor.' 45 The theory behind limiting this discharge
exception to intentional torts is consistent with the rehabilitative goals of
the Act, and its discharge provisions. "The purpose of the Bankruptcy Act
was to relieve failing honest debtors from their money obligations, and not
to free tortious debtors from liability for their wrongs."' 146 In other words,
142. Note, supra note 37, at 237-38 (citing Bankruptcy Act §§ 70(A)(5) & (6), 52 Stat. 879,
880 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1958)).
143. According to Black's Law Dictionary:
The discharge of the bankrupt is the step which regularly follows the adjudication of bank-
ruptcy and the administration of his estate. By it the debtor is released from the obligation
of all his debts which were or might be proved in the proceedings, so that they are no
longer a charge upon him, and so that he may thereafter engage in business and acquire
property without its being liable for the satisfaction of such former debts.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 417 (5th ed. 1979).
144. Recent amendments to the Federal Bankruptcy Act have also included drunk drivers as
debtors who will not be discharged from their debts. See Federal Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 523(a)(9) (West 1979) (A debt which "arises from a judgment or consent decree entered into a
court of record against the debtor wherein liability was incurred by such debtor as a result of the
debtor's operation of a motor vehicle while legally intoxicated" will not be discharged.).
145. According to Section 523 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, an individual will not be dis-
charged from his debt "for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the
property of another entity." I I U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(6). "Entity" includes person, estate, trust, or
governmental unit. II U.S.C.A. § 101(14).
According to the legislative history behind Section 523, " 'willful' means deliberate or inten-
tional. To the extent that Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 [1904], held that a looser standard is
intended, and to the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a 'reckless disregard'
standard, they are overruled." NOTES OF COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 365, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 6320-21; see
also G. TREISTER, J.R. TROST, L. FORMAN, K. KLEE & R. LEVIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF BANK-
RUPTCY LAW § 7.08(f), at 323 (1988).
146. Tinker, 193 U.S. at 480 (citing Turner v. Turner, 108 F. 785 (D.C. Ind. 1901); Disler v.
McCauley, 35 Misc. 411, 71 N.Y.S. 949 (1901), rev'd, 60 A.D. 42, 73 N.Y.S. 270 (1901)).
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as the exceptions to discharge seem to indicate, discharge from bankruptcy
will be granted to give a bankrupt a fresh start "if the debtor's inability to
pay his debts is substantially the result of causes not reasonably within his
control .... , 147
Therefore, if the law of bankruptcy is concerned enough about the resto-
ration of tort victims - specifically, intentional tort victims - to preclude
a debtor from discharging his intentional tort debts, then why does the law
of spendthrift trusts prevent the restoration of a tort victim - even an in-
tentional tort victim - by precluding him from reaching his tortfeasor's
beneficial interest in a spendthrift trust?
At least, if the Wisconsin Legislature is not yet ready to recognize a
"total" tort-creditor exception to the spendthrift trust doctrine, perhaps it
should consider an intentional tort-creditor exception. 14" Based on this
analogy to bankruptcy law, the Wisconsin Legislature could permit an in-
tentional tort victim creditor to reach his intentional tortfeasor's beneficial
interest in a spendthrift trust, thereby precluding the intentional tortfeasor
from escaping liability for his intentional or malicious acts. Only a
tortfeasor who has caused injury by committing an act "not reasonably
within his control,"' 149 i.e., via negligence or strict liability, would be pro-
tected by spendthrift trust provisions.
V. CONCLUSION
The Wisconsin Legislature should amend Section 701.06 of the Wiscon-
sin statutes to include a tort-creditor exception to the spendthrift trust doc-
trine. No compelling or even good reason exists to refuse statutory
recognition of such an exception. The principal argument advanced against
147. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 (1973), reprinted in L. KING, R. LEVINE & K.
KLEE, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY Pt. 1 [App. 2], at 174-75 (15th ed. 1989).
148. A similar suggestion has already been made by 2A A. SCOTT, supra note 20, § 157.5, at
222 n.1.
Even in the case of spendthrift trusts, a distinction might well be made between situations
in which the beneficiary was at fault and those in which tort liability is imposed by law
although there is no fault, as in the cases of absolute liability, strict liability for products,
and liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior for torts committed by a servant,
such as a driver employed by an elderly beneficiary.
Id.
Moreover, due to the Federal Bankruptcy Code's inclusion of drunk drivers on the list of
debtors unable to have their debts (which relate to driving while intoxicated) discharged, perhaps
the Wisconsin Legislature should consider an intentional/drunk driving tort-creditor exception.
See supra note 144.
149. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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the exception, cujes est dare, ejus est disponere,5° is weak, if not meaning-
less in light of the legislature's recognition that spendthrift trusts in Wiscon-
sin, though valid, are not absolute. 5' For public policy reasons, the
Wisconsin Legislature has departed from its pre-1971, pro-settlor views of
the spendthrift trust doctrine by recognizing three exceptions.1 52 Now, for
additional public policy reasons, the Wisconsin Legislature should recog-
nize a fourth exception.1 53
Alternatively, if the Legislature is not ready to adopt a "total" tort-
creditor exception, whereby a spendthrift trust would be void as to "all"
tort creditors, the Legislature could take the lead of the drafters of the Fed-
eral Bankruptcy Act and draw a distinction between intentional tortfeasors
and unintentional tortfeasors. 5 4 Based on this distinction, therefore, the
Wisconsin Legislature could recognize an intentional tort-creditor excep-
tion whereby, in addition to the already-existing statutory exceptions, a
spendthrift trust would be reachable only by intentional tort creditors -
those upon whom the beneficiary "willfully and maliciously" '155 committed
a tort.
A "total" tort-creditor exception, however, complies more consistently
with public policy and the view that tort creditors - all tort creditors -
should be-restored economically as well as physically, regardless of whether
the tort was intentional or not. 156 Moreover, while spendthrift trusts are
created to protect beneficiaries from voluntary creditors, i.e., the benefi-
ciaries' financial improvidence, spendthrift trusts are not created to protect
beneficiaries from involuntary creditors such as tort creditors, who have no
ability to conduct credit checks on their tortfeasors, and who deserve com-
pensation from their tortfeasors.15 7
Opponents of the tort-creditor exception argue that a tort creditor who
is unable to reach his tortfeasor's beneficial interest of a spendthrift trust in
satisfaction of the tort claim is in a position no worse than a tort creditor of
a penniless tortfeasor who has no trust.'58 However, while it is granted that
150. See supra note 28 and accompanying text for the English translation of this Latin
phrase.
151. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 76-92 and accompanying text.
154. See Federal Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(6) (West 1979); see also supra notes
141-46 and accompanying text.
155. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(6).
156. See supra notes 119-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the public policy anal-
ogies to other areas of the law.
157. See supra notes 32, 81-86 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 73:109
SPENDTHRIFT TRUST DOCTRINE
a tort creditor of a penniless tortfeasor would be without a financial remedy,
there is no reason to extend the misfortune to a tort creditor of a tortfeasor
who is also the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust. There is no reason to
deprive a tort creditor of damages due him when his tortfeasor is not penni-
less - when there are assets of the tortfeasor in existence. As one legal
scholar noted: "There appears to be no equity whatever, and little if any
justice, in permitting the tortfeasor to enjoy the comparative luxury of his
trust income while the tort claimant receives no recompense for the injury
suffered at his hands." 159
If Wisconsin amends Section 701.06 of the Wisconsin statutes to include
a tort-creditor exception to the spendthrift trust doctrine, it will become the
second state - following Louisiana's lead - to do the "right thing.""16
After all, what Professor Griswold stated several decades ago still holds
true: "Trusts are the creature of equity, and they should be administered in
a way that is consistent with true equity." 6 '
LAURENE M. BROOKS
159. Note, supra note 2, at 517.
160. See supra note 99 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 93-98 and accompanying
text.
161. E. GRISWOLD, supra note 18, § 339, at 399 (quoted in Note, supra note 40, at 220).
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